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promotion of justice would be greatly aided thereby. Actually a statute
designed to approximate this result was proposed in New York in 1935," s
but was not accepted. Later a modified form of the proposal was
enacted which allows for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements
provided they be in writing and sworn to.39 Commenting on the pro-
posal, Professor Ladd suggested that it would be simpler to solve the
entire problem by enacting a statute reading: "No party shall be pre-
cluded from impeaching a witness because the witness is his own."4
In view of the statutes which have been enacted and the exceptions
recognized in some States, there can be little doubt that the trend in the
development of the law today is towards a modification of the rule,
particularly with respect to prior inconsistent statements. It may be that
the courts can find some justification for retaining the rule with respect
to the other modes of impeachment, but it would be helpful if they
would review its foundations in the light of present day circumstances.
WILLIAM L. ANDERSON
EVIDENCE - PRESUMPTION AGAINST SUICIDE - NATURE AND
EFFECT ON BURDEN OF PROOF
Under the early common law suicide was a felony of serious import
considered more atrocious than murder. Hartman, The Presumption
Against Suicide As Applied in Insurance Cases (1935) i9 Marq. L.
Rev. 20; State v. LaFayette, 15 N. J. Misc. 115, 188 At. 918
(937). Blackstone describes how the suicide was given an ignominious
burial along the highway, with a stake driven through his body; more-
over, all his goods and chattels were forfeited to the crown. 4 Bl.
Comm. Although the exact date when the presumption against suicide
arose is not known, it was during this early period that the judges
created this device to ease the harshness of the penalty placed upon the
innocent family of the deceased. At the present time suicide is not
treated with such severity and the original basis for the presumption
is gone. However, the presumption still continues to be a rule of law in
most of our states. Mitchell v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 135
Ohio St. Iio, 19 N.E. (2d) 769 (1939); Wilder'sAdmr. v. Southern
Mining Co., 265 Ky. 219, 96 S.W. (2d) 436 (1936); Dow v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 7 N.E. (2d) 426 (Mass., 1937);
Falkinburg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 4merica, 132 Neb. 831, 273
ss Recommended changes in Practice Procedure & Evidence, Commission on the Ad-
ministration of Justice in New York State, p. 61, sec. 38.
:9 New York Civil Proc. Act. 1937, sec. 343-a.40 See note 4, supra.
N. 478 (937); Honrath v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 S. Dak.
480, 275 N.W. 258 (937); Texas and N. 0. .R. Co. v. Eawing et al.,
46 S.W. (2d) 398 (Tex. Civ. Apps., 1931); statutory presumption,
New York, Workmen's Compensation Law, sec. 21. The existence
of the presumption as a rule of law has been denied in one recent case.
Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of A1merca, 315 Pa. 497, 173 Ad. 644,
95 A.L.R. 869 (1934). Now, the presumption is more often expressed
as being based on fear of death and love of life. Stuckum v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 283 Mich. 297, 277 N.W. 891 (1938); Ilonrath v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 65 S. Dak. 480, 275 N.W. 258 (1937);
Dow v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 7 N.E. (2d) 426
(Mass., 1937); Consumers Co. v. Industrial Commission et al., 364
Ill. 145, 4 N.E. (2d) 34 (1936); Wilder's Admr. v. Southern Min-
ing Co., 265 Ky. 219, 96 S.XV. (2d) 436 (1936). However, some
courts, calling suicide a crime, have based the presumption on innocent
as opposed to criminal behavior. Sovereign Camp., W.O.W. v. Dennis,
17 Ala. App. 642, 87 So. 616 (1920); ilmond v. Modern Woodmen
of America, 133 Mo. App. 382, 113 S.W. 695 (19o8); Angersbach
v. South River Police Pension Commission, 3 Ad. (2d) 873 (N. J.
Supreme Ct., 1939). The presumption is not based either upon any
difficulty of producing the evidence, or upon the fact that the evidence
is peculiarly within the possession of one of the parties, or upon the
judgment of the courts as to what is socially desirable.
At the most, the so-called presumption against suicide in the very
nature of things, cannot be an absolute or conclusive presumption. We
know that men do, in fact, commit suicide. The courts agree that the
presumption is rebuttable. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Em-
ployees v. Page, 123 S.W. (2d) 536 (Ark., 1939); Bergman v.
Supreme Tent, Knights of Maccabees of the World, 203 Mo. App. 685,
220 S.W. 1029 (1920); Falkenburg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer-
ica, 132 Neb. 831, 273 N.W. 478 (937); Abbott v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 433, 276 N.W. 5o6 (1937); McDaniel et al.
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 195 S.E. 597 (W. Va., 1937). In fact,
in the light of the increasing rate of suicides, the balance of probabilities
is not nearly as strong in favor of accidental over suicidal deaths as it
once was. Supra, 19 Marq. L. Rev. 20; Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America, 315 Pa. 497, 173 Ad. 644, 95 A.L.R. 869 0934). In-
terestingly enough, the presumption against suicide is confined to civil
cases; there is no presumption against suicide in criminal cases. Persons
v. State, 90 Tenn. 291, 16 S.W. 726 (1891); People v. Creasy, 236
N.Y. 205, 14o N.E. 563 (1923); People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54,
177 N.E. 3o6 (193).
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Regardless of how strong or weak the basis upon which the pre-
sumption rests is thought to be, the fact remains that the presumption
still exists. The problem, then, is as to what effect this presumption
shall be held to have upon the ultimate burden of proof. No court holds
that the presumption against suicide is conclusive. Wigmore states, "In
strictness there cannot be such a thing as a 'conclusive presumption.'"
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, (Vol. 5, 2d Ed.) sec. 2492. Sharply con-
flicting positions are taken by the courts as to the general effect of this
presumption. The majority of the courts follow what is known as the
Thayer-Wigmore view. 103 A.L.R. 185 (1936). Under this view
the presumption is merely a guide-post for the judge; it disappears or
drops out when evidence to the contrary is introduced by the party
against whom the presumption operates. Brunswick v. Standard Zcc.
Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S.W. 45, 7 A.L.R. 1213 (i919);
Wirthlin v. Mutual Life Ins. CO., 56 Fed. (2d) 137, 86 A.L.R. 138
(io Cir. Ct. of App., 1932). It has no artificial probative weight as
evidence and has no effect on the ultimate burden of proof, which
remains just as it would under the pleadings had no presumption been
indulged in. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
(1898) 353, et seq.; WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, (Vol. 5, 2d Ed.) sec-
tions 2485, 2486, 2491. The effect of the presumption under this
view would be merely to place the burden of coming forward with the
evidence upon the party against whom the presumption operates. If so,
the presumption is purely a rule of law for the judge, and after its
purpose has been served, it need not be mentioned in the court's charge
to the jury. Evidently, the Thayer-Wigmore formula is intended for
all cases regardless of the many different types of presumptions which
are in use.
In a second group of cases, even where rebutting evidence has been
introduced, the presumption against suicide is held to have probative
weight as evidence to be considered by the jury. Provident Life and
Accident Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W. (2d) 251
(935); Connell v. Traveling Men's Zssociation, 139 Iowa 444, 116
N.W. 820 (19o8); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beason, 229 Ala. 140,
155 So. 530 (1934); Mitchell v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,
135 Ohio St. iio, 19 N.E. (2d) 769 (1939). However, most of
these courts speak of the presumption not as evidence but rather as
being in the nature of evidence. It is not at all clear what is thought to
be the distinction. Usually, after holding that the presumption against
suicide is in the nature of evidence, the courts say that it has different
effects depending on the nature and amount of actual evidence present.
The most critical challenge, however, to the Thayer-Wigmore doc-
trine is the rule which a number of courts apply to certain specific pre-
sumptions. In all cases involving presumptions the Pennsylvania courts
hold that the presumption operates to put upon the opponent the burden
of persuading the jury that the presumed fact does not exist. Holzheimer
v. Lit Bros., 262 Pa. 150, 105 Ad. 73 (1918); Watkins v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of 11merica, 315 Pa. 497, 173 Ad. 644, 95 A.L.R. 869
(1934). Adhering to this view of presumptions, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, ruled that
the so-called presumption against suicide is not a presumption but merely
a permissible consideration of the nonprobability of death by suicide.
When confronted with the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in
wedlock, all courts take the view that the presumption shifts the ulti-
mate burden of proof. In certain other cases including some involving
res ispa loquitur, some courts are also in accord. Saunders v. Fredette,
84 N.H. 414, 151 At. 82o (1930); Weber v. Chicago R. 1. and P.
Ry. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915); Price v. Metropolitan
St. Ry. Co., 220 Mo. 435, 119 S.W. 932, 132 Am. St. Rep. 588
(i909); Kapros v. Pierce Oil Corporation, 324 Mo. 992, 25 S.W.
(2d) 777 (1930); Sullivan v. Charleston and W. C. Ry. Co., 85
S. Car. 532, 67 S.E. 905 (1910). Missouri has recently abandoned
this view in res ispa cases. McCloskey v. Koplar et al., 329 Mo. 527,
46 S.WV. (2d) 557 (1932). However, no court has held that the pre-
sumption against suicide shifts the ultimate burden of proof. In accord-
ance with the Pennsylvania view, there is a dictum in an Ohio case,
Glowacki v. North Western Ohio Ry. and Power Co., 116 Ohio St.
451, 157 N.E. 21, 53 A.L.R. 1486 (1927), to the effect that if a
presumption were present, it would shift the ultimate burden of proof.
This dictum has not been followed in subsequent Ohio cases.
In the case of Mitchell v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 135 Ohio
St. 1IO, 19 N.E. (2d) 769 (I939), the Supreme Court of Ohio
adopted the view that the presumption against suicide is in the nature
of evidence. This was a workmen's compensation case wherein the
claimant could not recover compensation if the injury causing death was
purposely self-inflicted. Ohio G. C. sec. 1465-68. The presumption
against suicide arose after evidence was adduced showing a violent
external death. The court held that the presumption operates to its
fullest extent only where there is no proof as to whether the death was
accidental or suicidal. But even if such proof were present, the presump-
tion is still to be given probative weight, although not as much weight
as actual evidence. In a dictum the court suggested that if the actual
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evidence adduced were so clear that reasonable minds could come to but
one conclusion on the issue of accidental death or suicide, the presump-
tion against suicide drops out and has no further effect upon the deter-
mination of the issue. By holding that the presumption against suicide is
in the nature of evidence, the Ohio Court adopted the minority view
heretofore followed in but three states, viz., Tennessee, Iowa, and Ala-
bama. Provident Life and dccident Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124,
83 S.W. (2d) 251 (1935); Accident Ins. Co. of North dmerica v.
Bennett, 9o Tenn. 256, 16 S.W. 723 (1891); Connell v. Traveling
Men's Association, 139 Iowa 444, 116 N.W. 82o (I9O8); Tackman
v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 132 Iowa 64, io6 N.W. 350,
8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 974 (19o6); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beason,
229 Ala. 140, 155 So. 530 (934); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New
York v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So. 383 (1930). The Alabama
court held that the presumption against suicide is analogous to the
presumption of innocence, which latter presumption is held to be in the
nature of evidence in Alabama. Ohio, however, takes a different view
in regard to the presumption of innocence. In Ohio, the presumption
of innocence is neither evidence nor in the nature of evidence. Its sole
function is to require the courts to charge that the state must prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. Morehead v. The State of Ohio, 34
Ohio St. 212 (1877). Ohio General Code section 13442-3 codifies
the rule of this early Ohio case.
However, in a will contest the presumption of due validity of the
will, which arises from the order of probate, is held to be evidence of
probative value. The contestant, if he is to succeed in upsetting the
will, must adduce sufficient evidence to outweigh by a preponderance of
the evidence both the evidence produced by the proponent and the pre-
sumption arising from the order of probate. Hall v. Hall, 78 Ohio St.
415, 85 N.E. 1125, 15 Ohio Dec. 161, 2 Ohio Law Rep. 328
(19o8); West v. Lucas et al., Io6 Ohio St. 255, 139 N.E. 859
(1922); see note (1936) 2 O.S.L.J. 292. This decision, however,
was based on the wording of a statute which made the order of probate
prima facie evidence of due validity. Ohio G.C. sec. 12o83.
It is evident that the Ohio courts have not adopted one general
formula which they apply to all presumptions regardless of their nature
or reason for existence. Nor have the Ohio courts announced an inten-
tion or evinced an inclination to follow the suggestions of Mr. Bohlen
and Mr. Morgan. Bohlen, The Effect of -Rebuttable Presumptions of
Law upon the Burden of Proof (192o) 68 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 307,
reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 636;
410
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions (1930) 44
Harv. L. Rev. 906. Challenging Mr. Thayer and Mr. Wigmore, they
suggest that no general rule can be laid down as to the effect which all
presumptions have. This must depend upon the purpose each particular
presumption is designed to serve. A few states have recognized the
judiciousness of this suggestion and have indicated that presumptions
should be classified according to the purpose each is to serve. Zabarsky
v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 97 Vt. 377, 123 At. 520 (1923); Bond
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 315 Mo. 987, 288 S.W. 777 (1926);
O'Dea v. Omodeo et al., 118 Conn. 58, 17o Adt. 486 (1934); Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So.
383 (1930). Embodied in this view are practical advantages which
are nonexistent in the arbitrary Thayer-W~igmore formula. The Su-
preme Court of Ohio would obviate confusion were it to indicate which
view it favors.
Under the Thayer-lVigmore view the presumption against suicide
would not be held to be in the nature of evidence. Similarly, following
the reasoning of Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Morgan, it would seem that the
presumption against suicide, from its very nature, could not be placed
in a class with those presumptions which have probative weight. It is
based on common experience and a balance of probabilities; it seems to
have no real evidential value. If the presumption has inferential value,
this value will remain even after the presumption has disappeared. How-
ever, it appears that this presumption would serve its purpose if it merely
cast upon the adverse party the burden of coming forward with the
evidence. Apparently, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for the jury members to weigh a presumption. Seemingly, such an arti-
ficial thing is not susceptible of being set off as against conflicting evi-
dence. An instruction that the presumption is in the nature of evidence
to be weighed with the other evidence would serve only to confuse
further an already bewildered jury. The benefit which obtains to the
one in whose favor the presumption operates is rather questionable. It
is difficult to ascertain just how closely or scrupulously juries follow, or
attempt to follow, the instructions of the trial judge. Practically, there
is much danger that an erroneous charge will be given which will con-
stitute prejudicial error. Each year many cases are actually reversed
because of the giving or the failure to give an instruction on presump-
tions and matters relating to the burden of proof.
In the light of these circumstances, it would appear highly desirable
that the Supreme Court of Ohio review the law relating to presumptions
and indicate what, in its opinion, the nature of a presumption should be,
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what is gained by calling a presumption "evidence" or "in the nature of
evidence," and what effect the presumption should have upon the burden
of coming forward with the evidence and upon the ultimate burden of
proof. If the Court were to conclude that no single rule could be applied
to all presumptions, a statement to that effect would be helpful. A defi-
nite commitment by the Supreme Court of Ohio would obviate much of
the misunderstanding which now obtains in the field of presumptions.
ROGER H. SMITH
EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The defendant was charged with a violation of Ohio G. C. sec.
6296-3o by operating a motor vehicle while in a state of intoxication or
under the influence of alcohol. He refused to submit to a blood test or
urinalysis to determine the amount of alcohol in his system. The Court
of Appeals for Wayne County said that since the privilege against self-
incrimination as guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution applies only to dis-
closure by utterance, evidence of the demand and refusal was admissible
and there was no error in permitting the prosecutor to urge the refusal
as an inference of the guilt of the defendant. State v. Gatton, 6o Ohio
App. 192, 14 Ohio 0. 2o (1938).
Art. I, sec. Io of the Ohio Constitution as amended in 1912 pro-
vides, . . . "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; but his failure to testify may be considered by
the court and jury and may be the subject of comment by counsel. .. ."
Ohio G. C. sec. 13444-3 provides that a criminal defendant ". . . may
at his own request be a witness but not otherwise. . . ." The result is
that the state may comment on the failure of the defendant to testify
but would not be permitted to call him to the stand and force him to
claim the privilege. Practically all states have constitutional provisions
giving the defendant a privilege but very few authorize comment by the
prosecution. (See Calif. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 as amended in 1934).
In the principal case the comment by the state upon the defendant's
failure to submit to these tests before trial would be meaningless unless
it was first shown that the defendant was asked to submit to the tests
and refused to do so. Would this be similar to an attempt by the state
to call the defendant to the stand in order to force him to claim his
privilege? Or would there be any violation of the privilege if these
tests had been made against the will of the defendant? The holding of
the court here is that "the privilege against self-incrimination . . . ap-
plies only to disclosure by utterance, oral or written." This position has
